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Piercing the Privacy Veil:
Toward a Saner Balancing of Privacy and
Health in Cases of Severe Mental Illness
Jorgio Castro*
On November 19, 2013, Virginia state senator and former candidate for governor Robert
Creigh Deeds suffered a high-profile attack from his son, who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, resulting in permanent injuries to himself and his son’s self-inflicted death.
On June 16, 2015, Senator Deeds addressed Congress to highlight one of the biggest
challenges to providing adequate intervention and support for his son—the HIPAA
Privacy Rule’s restriction on the release of protected health information to family
caretakers. Senator Deeds’s high-profile story emerged as a national indication of a
serious problem: the immense difficulty experienced by families trying to obtain critical
information regarding their loved one diagnosed with serious mental illness. While the
delivery of adequate mental health treatment is a large and complicated effort governed
by many regulatory statutes, advocates have identified in particular the barrier on
receiving information from health care providers regarding their loved one’s illness—
particularly during involuntary psychiatric holds—as one key barrier to effectively
assisting in their treatment. Although the Privacy Rule attempts to balance competing
principles of respect for autonomy, the best interests of the patient, and efficiency of the
system, it has created substantial barriers to effective treatment in this area without
actually advancing its purposes. This Note suggests possible fixes for this exigent issue.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Robert Schwartz and Lois Weithorn, who have provided tremendous support, assistance,
and feedback in the creation of this Note. Thank you to the staff of Hastings Law Journal for all of
their work on this Note, especially Volume 66 Executive Notes Editor, H. Elliot Hosman, and Volume
67 Executive Notes Editor, Elizabeth Lee. I would also like to thank my parents, extended family, and
friends. This Note is dedicated to those suffering from serious mental illness, and the family and
friends who love them and are struggling to help.
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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) contains strict privacy provisions that protect individually
identifiable health information. In general, the provisions prevent release
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of information to anyone other than the patient or the patient’s personal
1
representative without explicit consent from the individual patient.
2
Many state privacy laws do the same, also mandating notice about these
information disclosure regulations to an individual being held under an
3
involuntary psychiatric hold. HIPAA’s default restriction against release
4
of patient information acts as a barrier to family caregivers receiving
information about their loved one during an involuntary psychiatric hold.
In many instances this barrier to sharing poses a serious problem to
individuals’ long-term health and to the family caregivers’ involvement in
5
their care.
Family caregivers are often left uninformed of either the details of
6
their family member’s diagnosis or symptoms, as well as the details of
7
treatments available or under consideration. Further, HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule (“Privacy Rule”) often prevents family caregivers from even
8
knowing if a hospital is involuntarily holding their family member.

1. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2014); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Office for Rights,
Sharing Health Information with Family and Friends, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/consumers/sharing-family-friends.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Individual
psychotherapy notes are even harder on which to receive information. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2014).
2. This Note will not discuss state privacy law in detail. See infra note 55.
3. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5150(f)(1), (h)(1) (West 2014) (requiring the provision
of information about the basis for the hold, the individual’s rights, and the basic contours of the hold);
see also Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i) (West 2011) (requiring disclosure
of rights and policies of providers that receive Medicaid or Medicare funding). Here, there is a
mandated effort to give individual information on which to base subsequent medical decisions, even
under circumstances calling into question their ability to make those decisions.
4. “Family caregiver” or “family caretaker” is used throughout the Note to also include close
friends and adults who exhibit special care and concern for the patient. Similarly, “family member” or
“loved one” will be used to include those close friends and adults who are the subject of that special
care and concern. This reflects an inclusive definition of family that has been accepted by many state
legislatures and the Uniform Law Commissioners. See infra Part III.B.
5. Tell Your Representative That HIPAA Hurts People with Severe Mental Illness, Treatment Advoc.
Center (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2299tell-your-representative-that-hipaa-hurts-people-with-severe-mental-illness.
6. In many state jurisdictions, some information can be released by the treatment provider under
a “duty to warn” if an individual has stated an intention to harm another. See Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2014) (permitting covered
entities to release PHI over patient’s objection “to avert a serious threat to health or safety”). This
Note proposes release of more information to specified caregivers for the long-term treatment of the
individual, independent of any threats to those caregivers.
7. Mother Sues Son for Access to Medical Records, Treatment Advoc. Center (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/128 (“The Treatment Advocacy Center
routinely receives phone calls from patients and family members frustrated that privacy laws prevent them
from helping desperately ill loved ones get appropriate treatment and keep them from being aware of
safety issues.”).
8. Caregivers can still offer information to the health care provider. See HIPAA at a Glance,
Treatment Advoc. Center, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/component/content/article/1850
(last visited Aug. 5, 2015); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information Related to Mental Health,
U.S. Department Health & Hum. Services, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/
special/mhguidance.html (last visited August 5, 2015) (“HIPAA in no way prevents health care providers
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Furthermore, when an individual is involuntarily held for meeting
10
certain criteria stemming from mental illness, the effects of her mental
illness on her ability to make well-considered and wise decisions in her
11
own best interests often prevent her from consenting to release of the
health information, or even undergoing treatment because of an inability
12
to recognize the existence of the illness. This Note will explore this
problem and propose changes to both the Privacy Rule and its
implementation in order to more effectively address the challenges faced
13
by patients, families, and American society.
This Note will also explore the problem created by the Privacy
Rule’s prevention of release of information to an individual’s family
member when the individual is held on an involuntary psychiatric hold. It
will discuss current doctrines and rationales in the context of health care
decisionmaking.
Finally, this Note will propose several solutions to the problem. The
first proposal calls for instituting a college HIPAA waiver process that
designates a family caregiver to receive notice when a family member is
from listening to family members or other caregivers who may have concerns about the health and well-being
of the patient . . . .”).
9. The term “involuntary psychiatric hold” comes from many state statutes that provide for the
hospitalization and monitoring of an individual for a short period of time under certain conditions.
See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (West 2014). The purpose of such holds is to “determine
whether the person is in such mental condition as to justify the state in depriving him of his personal
liberty and affording him, if it is found needed, benefit of proper care and remedial aid.” Hsu v. Mt.
Zion Hosp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (Ct. App. 1968) (emphasis added).
10. When the term “mental illness” has been used in federal legislation, it traditionally has been
interpreted to include all disorders in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the
Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 Psychiatric Services 1089, 1090 (2002).
11. The Anatomical Basis of Anosognosia (Lack of Awareness of Illness), Treatment Advoc.
Center (May 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/Research/anosognosia_
backgrounder_may_2013.pdf.
12. Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia: Anosognosia,
Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 25, 28 (2000) (“Poor insight in
schizophrenia bears remarkable similarities to anosognosia in neurological disorders. Patients with
schizophrenia who have poor insight, and neurological disorder patients with anosognosia, exhibit the
following characteristics: a very severe lack of awareness of their illness, the belief persisting despite
conflicting evidence, confabulations to explain the observations that contradict their belief that they
are not ill, and a compulsion to prove their self-concept.”).
13. The Author would like to emphasize that mental illnesses, including serious mental illnesses,
are more treatable now than ever before. Recovery is possible and has been the subject of major
movies and popular culture. See, e.g., Steve Lopez, Checking in with Nathaniel Ayers, L.A. Times (Oct.
11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-1012-lopez-nateupdate-20141011-column.html (providing
update on Nathaniel Ayers, who columnist, Steve Lopez, has known for ten years); The Soloist
(DreamWorks Pictures 2009) (detailing the experiences of Nathaniel Ayers, Julliard-trained bassist). See
also Nicole Mulvaney, ‘A Beautiful Mind’ Mathematician at Princeton University Awarded $800k Abel
Prize,
NJ.com
(Mar.
25,
2015
6:05
PM),
http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2015/03/
a_beautiful_mind_princeton_university_mathematicia.html (exploring the life of the late John Nash,
Noble Laureate in Economics); A Beautiful Mind (Universal Pictures 2001). Some accomplish the
extraordinary. Many contribute to society. All create meaningful lives.
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admitted to an involuntary psychiatric hold. Second, this Note proposes
recognizing “family caregivers” to be defined broadly to include
individuals not related by blood or marriage as part of the potential
treatment team. Finally, this Note suggests recognizing family caregivers
as personal representatives within the language of the HIPAA statute,
and thus affording them access to the individual’s protected health
15
information (“PHI”).
Part I will discuss the current Privacy Rule and its effect on the
release of information during involuntary psychiatric holds. Part II will
discuss providers’ incentives to withhold information, even when release
is permitted under the Privacy Rule. Part III will discuss principles,
doctrines, and statutory schemes underlying health care decisionmaking
generally, and the decision to release health information specifically. Part
IV will discuss possible solutions consistent with those general health
care decisionmaking principles.

I. The Privacy Rule in a Nutshell
Congress passed HIPAA in 1996, and the Act’s Privacy Rule took
16
effect in 2003. Congress then made amendments to HIPAA in the
17
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and added the final
18
HIPAA amendments in 2013. The Department of Health and Human
Services (“DHHS”) has statutory authority to promulgate regulations
19
under the Privacy Rule and is responsible for enforcing the Privacy
20
Rule. In the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, DHHS provides:

14. The proposal only affects adults eighteen years and older because before then, adult caretakers
such as parents or guardians of an individual generally have access to their health information.
15. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
16. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
17. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
18. Modifications to HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
19. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164.102–106 &164.500–534.
20. HIPAA Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
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This regulation has three major purposes: (1) To protect and enhance
the rights of consumers by providing them access to their health
information and controlling the inappropriate use of that information;
(2) to improve the quality of health care in the United States by
restoring trust in the health care system among consumers, health care
professionals, and the multitude of organizations and individuals
committed to the delivery of care; and (3) to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a national
framework for health privacy protection that builds on efforts by
21
states, health systems, and individual organizations and individuals.

Expert commentators note that the Privacy Rule establishes “a set
of basic national privacy standards and fair information practices that
provides all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind
that is essential to their full participation in their care” and a “floor of
ground rules for health care providers . . . to follow, in order to protect
22
patients and encourage them to seek needed care.” Thus, a key
rationale underlying the Privacy Rule is that it will encourage individuals
to seek health care when they are sick (and know that they have an
23
illness ) because they will be confident that their private medical
information will be kept private. Generally, that is a strong normative
argument in favor of the Privacy Rule and its robust protections. The
ability of the Privacy Rule to effectuate peace of mind to encourage
people to seek care relies upon the individual having a subjective
understanding that they have an illness. Without that understanding,
there is no motivation to seek treatment, regardless of the Privacy Rule’s
24
existence. People who suffer from serious mental illness, but lack
25
understanding of their illness, will not seek treatment. This is especially
true under an involuntary psychiatric hold, where the individual often
21. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462,
82463 (Dec. 28, 2000).
22. Barry Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 268 (2013).
23. One court that defined the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term “illness” defined it as
“any abnormal condition of the body or its components of such a degree that in its natural progression
would be expected to be problematic; a deviation from the healthy or normal state affecting the
functions or tissues of the body; an inherent defect of the body; or a morbid physical or mental state
which deviates from or interrupts the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system of the
body and which is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs.” Katskee v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Neb. 1994).
24. This Note adheres to “people-first” language terminology used to describe conditions
accurately and not increase stigma against people suffering from such illnesses. See John Parry & Eric
Y. Drogin, Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony: A Comprehensive Reference
Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Mental Disability Professionals 4953 (A.B.A. 2007); see also
Carey Goldberg, A Phrase to Renounce for 2014: ‘The Mentally Ill’, WBUR’s CommonHealth (Jan. 3,
2014, 1:57 PM), http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2014/01/renounce-term-the-mentally-ill (showing the
highly influential Associated Press style guide adopting the position with a “new entry on mental
illness [that] says to refer to people ‘diagnosed with schizophrenia instead of schizophrenics’”).
25. Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness,
36 Hum. Services Res. 987, 1000 (Dec. 2001) (“[T]he majority of untreated people with SMI do not
believe that they have emotional problems that require treatment.”).
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did not seek out the treatment in the first instance. In these cases, the
Privacy Rule does not and cannot achieve that purpose of encouraging
people to seek health care. As a countervailing consideration, the Privacy
Rule also attempts to balance public responsibility with privacy
26
protections. This Note takes the position that in the area of involuntary
psychiatric holds, providers have shifted the balance too far away from
public responsibility by preventing release of information when a family
member is on an involuntary hold.
A. The Privacy Rule Currently Allows Health Care Providers to
Deny Release of Information to Family Caretakers When a
Family Member Is on a Psychiatric Hold
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule create problems in the context of
27
mental illness because they were not “written with mental illness in mind.”
This oversight results in serious problems when HIPAA inevitably impacts
the rights and treatment of individuals suffering from mental illness.
Even in the face of the long-standing stigma surrounding mental
illness, the national conversation on mental health, illness, and treatment
28
continues to expand. Advocates have coalesced and organizations have
formed in order to fight against and change the existing societal stigmas
29
against mental illness. President Barack Obama remarked during his
2015 State of the Union Address, “we’re a people who value the dignity
and worth of every citizen . . . [including] Americans with mental illness
30
or physical disability. Everybody matters.” The national conversation
reflects a greater awareness of mental illness, as serious mental illnesses

26. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 278; see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information,
supra note 8, at 1 (“At the same time, the Privacy Rule recognizes circumstances arise where health
information may need to be shared to ensure the patient receives the best treatment and for other
important purposes, such as for the health and safety of the patient or others.”).
27. Jenny Gold, Privacy Law Frustrates Parents of Mentally Ill Adult Children, NPR (June 4,
2014, 4:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/06/04/318765929/privacy-law-frustrates-parents-ofmentally-ill-adult-children.
28. President Obama Opens White House Mental Health Conference, C-SPAN (June 3, 2013),
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/313109-1; Untreated Mental Illness an Imminent Danger?, CBS News
(Sept. 29, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/untreated-mental-illness-an-imminent-danger; see
also Nicholas Kristof, First Up, Mental Illness. Next Topic Is Up to You, N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/kristof-first-up-mental-illness-next-topic-is-up-toyou.html.
29. See Bring Change 2 Mind, www.bringchange2mind.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Fight Stigma:
Become a StigmaBuster!, Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/Take_Action/Fight_Stigma/Fight_Stigma_StigmaBusters.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015);
Project 375, http://project375.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2015); Mental Health Program, Carter Center,
http://www.cartercenter.org/health/mental_health/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
30. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january20-2015.
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affect a large portion of the populationone in seventeen people. Some
of these illnesses, including major depression, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, are incredibly
debilitating and dangerous, and in some instances, lead to suicide and
32
higher rates of morbidity. As attention and funding are brought to bear
on services for mental illness, the involvement of the family members
and loved ones who provide caregiving and support remains an integral
33
aspect of the treatment process for people with mental illness. One
critical component of involving family caregivers in an individual’s
treatment is the information regarding the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis,
34
and treatment plans. The Privacy Rule’s current “authorization”
31. Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among U.S. Adults, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/serious-mental-illness-smi-among-us-adults.shtml
(estimating 9.6 million Americans, or 4.1% of population, have serious mental illness). The statistics
also acknowledge that people with serious mental illness are disproportionately less likely to answer
the survey, suggesting the prevalence is higher. Id. See also Press Release, World Health Org., Mental
Disorders Affect One in Four People (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2001/media_
centre/press_release/en/ (finding 450 million people worldwide suffer from a mental disorder).
32. See General Mental Illness, Brain & Behav. Res. Found., https://bbrfoundation.org/mentalillness-1 (noting the four diagnoses are amongst ten “leading causes of disability identified and tracked
in the United States and other developed countries”); Elizabeth Resinger et al., Mortality in Mental
Disorders and Global Disease Burden Implication: A Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 72 JAMA
Psychiatry 334 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2110027 (finding
“median years of potential life lost was 10 years” and concluding “estimates suggest that mental
disorders rank among the most substantial causes of death worldwide”); Depression Facts and Statistics,
Depression
Perception,
http://www.depressionperception.com/depression/depression-facts-andstatistics.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
33. Ian R.H. Falloon, Family Interventions for Mental Disorders: Efficacy and Effectiveness,
World Psychiatry (Feb. 2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1525058 (“There is sufficient
scientific evidence to conclude that strategies that enhance the caregiving capacity of family members
and other people involved in the day to day care for people with mental disorders have a clinically
significant impact on the course of major mental disorders.”). A second interwoven rationale allows
PHI disclosure to stem from family members’ desire to have information regarding where the individual
is, when they may not know, and to promote reunification. See, e.g., Accusations of Patient Dumping,
ABC News (May 2, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/accusations-patient-dumping-19096538
(showing James Brown suffering from severe mental illness, discharged from state hospital, and sent
out of state). Later, social workers helped contact Brown’s daughter, which led to reunification. See
Cynthia Hubert, Mentally Ill Man ‘Dumped’ by Nevada Has Happy Reunion with Daughter, Sacramento
Bee (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/2013/04/12/5336162/mentally-ill-man-dumped-by-nevada.html
(describing his daughter’s lack of knowledge of Brown’s whereabouts, their reunification, and
subsequent treatment plans and accommodations). Other stories drag on longer or do not end so
happily. See Ryan Lavis, Mental Illness and Missing Adults: Experts and Family Members Say the Law
Hinders Search Efforts for Loved Ones, SILive.com (May 4, 2014, 8:16 PM),
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/05/mentel_illness_and_missing_adu.html (“When a family is
trying to look for them, they can call every hospital in the area, but they can’t even tell them if their family
member is there—it’s a big problem.”).
34. See, e.g., Anthony F. Lehman et al., At Issue: Translating Research into Practice: The
Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team (PORT) Treatment Recommendations, 24 Schizophrenia
Bulletin 1, 8 (1998) (“Randomized clinical trials have repeatedly demonstrated that family interventions
that provide some combination of illness education, support, problem-solving training, and crisis
intervention, in combination with appropriate pharmacotherapy, reduce 1-year relapse rates from a 40
to 53 percent range to a 2 to 23 percent range.”).
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requirement stands as one significant barrier to the critical component of
caregiver involvement.
The Privacy Rule currently requires “authorization” before a
“covered entity” can release medical information about a particular
35
patient to another party. A “covered entity” is any health care plan or
36
provider that transmits health information in electronic form. In the
37
case of individuals suffering from a severe psychotic episode or other
event that necessitates short-term involuntary commitment, the Privacy
Rule’s prerelease authorization requirement is problematic because it
presupposes the capacity to make such an authorization that many might
lack during this time. Although there is one such exception for sharing
information under the Privacy Rule, it is complicated, left to the
discretion of the health care provider, and importantly, rarely actually
38
used in practice.
This Note discusses how to fix the exception for sharing information
in order to better serve the interests of the patient. One possible way to
circumvent the exception’s current barriers is to categorize the disclosure
of the patient’s treatment under involuntary psychiatric hold orders to a
39
known family caregiver as a form of “treatment” under HIPAA. Thus,
explicit authorization during an illness would no longer be required in
certain circumstances, and family caregivers’ role in the long-term
treatment of their loved ones would be formally recognized in the
40
Privacy Rule. Another solution this Note explores is to amend the
Privacy Rule to include designated family caregivers as “personal
41
representatives,” who, under HIPAA, would be entitled to receive the

35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2014).
36. Id.
37. See Psychosis, MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/001553.htm (defining psychosis as a “los[s of] contact with reality,” which usually includes,
“[having] false beliefs about what is taking place or who one is (delusions)” and “see[ing] or hear[ing] things
that aren’t there (hallucinations)” and disorganized thought and speech).
38. Tim Murphy, The Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act, http://murphy.house.gov/
uploads/Summary.pdf (finding lack of information sharing “because of complicated federal rules on
communicating with immediate family members and caregivers”). Congressman Murphy’s bill also
includes important policy changes to increase inpatient psychiatric beds, to increase rural and underserved
area access to psychologists and psychiatrists, to ensure NIMH money and federal grants are directed
towards evidence-based care, to guarantee Medicare and Medicaid coverage for psychiatric drugs, to
support NIMH research, and to support reauthorization of mental health courts and training for law
enforcement officers that interact with people going through acute psychiatric crisis. Id.; see also
HIPAA at a Glance, supra note 8.
39. The Privacy Rule defines treatment as “the provision, coordination, or management of health
care and related services by one or more health care providers, including the coordination or
management of health care by a health care provider with a third party.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2014).
The Privacy Rule permits use or disclosure of PHI for a covered entity’s own treatment purposes, or
the treatment activities of a health care provider. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1)–(2) (2014).
40. See infra Part IV.B.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2014).
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patient’s individually identifiable health information on her behalf. Yet
another possible approach is to institute a “psychiatric advance
43
directive” during college and post-secondary education enrollment—
44
when many mental illnesses first emerge. Such a directive would
specifically authorize information sharing, particularly during a future
45
acute psychiatric crisis. These implementations would provide clearer,
more effective guidance for when information should be released, and
would more definitively advance individual and family interests.
B. The Privacy Rule Currently Mandates “Incapacity” to Allow
Disclosure of Protected Health Information to Family
Caregivers
A slight exception to the stringent Privacy Rule currently exists for
limited emergency circumstances. Where a patient is considered “not
present” due to “incapacity or an emergency situation, the Privacy Rule
permits disclosures that the provider considers to be in the best interest
of the patient, but limits the information to that which is directly relevant
46
to the person’s involvement in the patient’s health care.” With this
exception, the Privacy Rule contemplates the situation where an
individual is involuntarily held, and allows for flexibility “in the best
47
interests” of the patient. This shows that the Privacy Rule’s intent is not
to completely prevent the flow of information from the provider to
family caregivers about an individual’s health during such a critical
48
period, but rather to limit release to cases where the physician
concludes in her professional judgment that it is in the patient’s best
interest.
However, the current exception has two clear shortcomings. First, it
is unclear and obscure, providing no guidance as to the exception’s policy
49
rationale for providers. Second, the release of information is only

42. See infra Part IV.C.
43. See infra Part III.C.
44. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, Mental Illness Exacts Heavy Toll, Beginning in
Youth (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2005/mental-illness-exactsheavy-toll-beginning-in-youth.shtml (“Half of all lifetime cases begin by age 14; three quarters have
begun by age 24. Thus, mental disorders are really the chronic diseases of the young.”).
45. See infra Part IV.A.
46. Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent Decisionmaking: Legal Issues with Respect to Treatment for
Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 75, 113 n.265 (2012); see also
45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(3) (2014); HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8.
47. This Note will discuss the “best interests” doctrine. See infra Part III.
48. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule (2003),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (stating the main
purpose of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is to define and limit when the PHI of an individual may be used or
disclosed by covered entities).
49. Adolescent Decisionmaking, supra note 46; see also Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 277
(“Nurses can speak over the phone with a patient or family member about the patient’s condition.”).
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permitted, not required. Because this release exception is unclear and
only permissive, health care providers do not, as a matter of hospital
policy, release PHI to the individual’s family without express written
51
consent. A key question is: Why?

II. Health Care Providers Have Incentives to Not Permit
Disclosure, Even When They Can
Health care providers might not permit disclosure of protected
health information for various reasons including liability, ambiguity of
liability, and financial and administrative costs. A provider may likely
enact a blanket policy of nondisclosure to avoid possible penalization by
52
the Office of Civil Rights of the DHHS (“OCR”). But the OCR does
not explicitly preclude a hospital representative from speaking over the
phone with a family member about the patient’s condition, and the
release of such information is authorized in circumstances where the
53
physician deems it in the best interest of the patient. By adopting a
nondisclosure policy, providers are acting with an overabundance of
caution to the detriment of the patient. This excessive caution is
unwarranted given HIPAA’s history of not penalizing covered entities
54
who violate the Privacy Rule. Alternatively, the health care provider
55
may also be attempting to avoid violation of state confidentiality laws.
50. Office for Civil Rights, A Health Care Provider’s Guide to the HIPAA Privacy Rule:
Communicating with a Patient’s Family, Friends, or Others Involved in the Patient’s Care 2,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/provider_ffg.pdf (last visited Aug.
5, 2015); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at n.1 (“The Privacy
Rule permits, but does not require, providers to disclose information in these situations. Providers who
are subject to more stringent privacy standards under other laws, such as certain state confidentiality laws or
42 C.F.R. Part 2, would need to consider whether there is a similar disclosure permission under those
laws that would apply in the circumstances.”).
51. How HIPAA Prevents Seriously Mentally Ill From Getting Good Care and What to Do About
It, Mental Illness Pol’y Org., http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/national-studies/HIPAA_handcuffs.pdf
(“covered entities default to nondisclosure”); see also Pete Earley, HIPAA: Does it Keep Key Information
From Family Members, Pete Earley Blog (May 17, 2013), http://www.peteearley.com/2013/05/17/
hipaa-does-it-keep-key-information-from-family-members/ (detailing one family’s experience being
repeatedly denied any information about their son on the basis of HIPAA, even at one point with
written consent from their son).
52. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 28081.
53. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8.
54. Does HIPAA Help or Hinder Patient Care And Public Safety?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H.R., 113th Cong. 33 (2013)
(statement of Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human
Services) (“We have received 80,000 complaints since we began enforcing. Only 12 of them have
resulted in monetary penalties.”).
55. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8. The Privacy Rule only
preempts state confidentiality laws that are directly contrary to it. How Do Other Privacy Protections
Interact with the Privacy Rule?, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/
pr_05.asp (last updated Feb. 2, 2007). To the extent state privacy laws may more stringently prohibit
disclosure, this Note advises that states revise their privacy law consistent with this Note’s suggestions
for HIPAA.
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Whatever the statutory concern, it appears that many health care
56
providers have enacted a “prophylactic” policy against releasing an
57
individual’s mental health information to family caretakers.
Another possible rationale driving health care providers’ blanket
nondisclosure policies is their misinterpretation that HIPAA prevents
the dissemination of such information without consent in all
58
circumstances. In fact, OCR had to issue an open letter to the nation’s
health care providers on this point, clarifying that HIPAA’s “Privacy
Rule does not prevent [their] ability to disclose necessary information
about a patient to law enforcement, family members of the patient, or
other persons, when [they] believe the patient presents a serious danger
59
to himself or other people.” Furthermore, OCR clarified that the
Privacy Rule offers the provider protection in her dissemination of the
60
patient’s information. The Privacy Rule establishes that “the provider is
presumed to have had a good faith belief when his or her belief is based
upon the provider’s actual knowledge . . . or in reliance on a credible
61
representation by a person with apparent knowledge or authority . . . .”
OCR’s letter referencing these provisions exemplifies the widespread
62
“misunderstanding” of the application of the Privacy Rule and
highlights the primacy that federal privacy law takes, superseding state
63
privacy law when HIPAA is more restrictive than the state law. While
OCR’s statement suggests that DHHS recognizes the misunderstanding
about the nature of HIPAA, this statement solely seeks to clarify
Tarasoff-like “duty to warn” requirements and protection for health care
providers’ disclosures that apply only in limited cases when there is a

56. The Supreme Court has used the term “prophylactic” to describe cautious measures used to
insure other rights are protected, such as the Miranda doctrine’s prophylactic protection of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). As
this Part and Note points out, however, such prophylaxis is inconsistent with the Privacy Rule itself.
57. See How HIPAA Prevents, supra note 51 (“[C]overed entities default to nondisclosure”).
58. Id. (suggesting this is sometimes done “out of ignorance of the law”).
59. Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., to Our Nation’s Health Care Providers (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2014).
62. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at 6 (reiterating that the
“Privacy Rule permits a health care provider to disclose necessary information about a patient to law
enforcement, family members of the patient, or other persons, when the provider believes the patient
presents a serious and imminent threat to self or others”). OCR also reiterated the exception for
disclosure to family caregivers in light of the Ebola outbreak and other events. See also Bulletin:
HIPAA
Privacy
in
Emergency
Situations,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Health
&
Hum.
Servs., (Nov. 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/emergenc
ysituations.pdf.
63. HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8, at 9 (“[M]ost states have laws
and/or court decisions which address, and in many instances require, disclosure of patient information
to prevent or lessen the risk of harm.”).
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serious danger to other persons. Such a statement only clarifies existing
“duty to warn” obligations and does not clarify or highlight the family
caregiver exception.
This OCR message also exemplifies another probable reason for the
“prophylactic” policy: the confusion that many providers experience
about what and when they can share with certain people without the
65
express consent of the patient. Often, when an actor (here, the health
care provider) is unclear about where the law draws the line, she will
generally stay far away from the line so as to avoid violating the law and
66
incurring penalties. To a certain extent, that decision may reflect astute
advice from the provider’s legal counsel in an attempt to protect the
provider in the face of ambiguous liability. While in some contexts
ambiguity may create desirable deterrence from action, in this area, it is
in the American public’s best interest for health care providers to both
comply with the law and provide the highest quality of care possible. It is
essential then that the lawmakers clarify the law in this area. In response
to the lack of understanding by health care providers of the Privacy
Rule’s treatment of PHI disclosure for family caretakers in this context,
DHHS recently released further guidance aimed at clarifying when it is
appropriate for a health care provider to share the PHI of a patient who
67
is being treated for a mental health condition. The guidance directly
clarifies, again, that the provider can, if the individual currently lacks
capacity, share information with the family member without the patient’s
68
consent if the provider believes it is in the best interest of the patient.

64. See supra note 6.
65. See, e.g., Chris Vanderveen, Family’s Tragedy Could Shed Light on Privacy Laws, 9news
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://ux.9news.com/longform/news/investigations/2015/02/09/ari-liggett-hipaa/23136843
(quoting sister of man who killed mother stating that the “doctor testified at trial that, because of Ari’s
rights and because of HIPAA laws, she was legally obligated to ignore my mom’s phone calls”); see
also Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (“[P]roblems include plain misunderstanding about
what the law requires and allows.”).
66. HIPAA: What’s Smoke, What’s Fire?Personally Speaking, Treatment Advoc. Center (Apr.
26, 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2300 (“[W]itnesses all
agreed that medical providers typically want to talk to family members but don’t because they feel
their lips are sealed by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule
and fear punishment.”); Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (suggesting providers “are
afraid of being sued”).
67. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8.
68. The relevant portion reads in part:
If, for example, the provider believes the patient cannot meaningfully agree or object to the
sharing of the patient’s information with family, friends, or other persons involved in their
care due to her current mental state, the provider is allowed to discuss the patient’s
condition or treatment with a family member, if the provider believes it would be in the
patient’s best interests. In making this determination about the patient’s best interests, the
provider should take into account the patient’s prior expressed preferences regarding
disclosures of their information, if any, as well as the circumstances of the current situation.
Id.
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A separate interest that the current health care provider default of
nondisclosure serves in this case is the patient’s privacy interest. While
important, that interest is not absolute and should be balanced with the
need for coordinated treatment while a patient experiences a severe
illness. This privacy interest is still preserved by the fact that the
proposed disclosure of the information will be limited only to family
caregivers. There is, generally speaking, less of a privacy intrusion in
69
disclosure to family caregivers than disclosure to say, one’s employer,
because the “family unit” necessarily includes relationships of trust that
70
very often do not exist in other circumstances.
Yet another interest at work here is that of saving the provider time
and money that often comes at the expense of the long-term health and
71
well-being of the patient. For the provider, more contact with more
people results in increased paperwork and staff time. Providers would
have to either pass such extra costs through their existing financing
structure, making the providers’ services less attractive to their
purchasers, or “eat” the cost from existing budgets. The prophylaxis also
arguably serves the providers’ related interests in administrative
convenience. It takes up less time and energy from busy hospital staff if
they do not have to deal with families and caregivers over the phone or
72
in person when policy or law does not require it. That rationale, again,
puts provider interests in “avoiding hassle” above the best interests of
the patient.
Despite attempts by OCR to clarify the HIPAA information sharing
provision, the permissive nature of the provision giving providers the
ability to withhold information stands as an obstacle to serving the best
interests of the patient, and inhibits its uniform application by health care
providers across the nation. Health care providers still have a big
incentive to not “go through all the hassle” of providing as much
information as may be permitted by law, even if communication with the
family caregiver is in the best interests of the patient’s long-term
treatment. The fear and uncertainty of civil penalties, administrative
costs associated with the increased transactional costs of disseminating
73
information, and general institutional inertia all stand as formidable
69. There may be circumstances when such trust does not exist between certain traditional family
members. See infra Part IV.D.2. This Note uses “family caregiver” and “family caretaker” to describe
individuals who exhibit special care and concern for one another and not solely individuals related by
blood or law.
70. Again, “family unit” here is more inclusively defined to include close friends and adults that
the individual has to chosen to include as “family” in their life.
71. How HIPAA Prevents Seriously Mentally Ill, supra note 51 (“[I]t serves the purposes of the
individual [health care provider] or organization”).
72. Privacy Law Frustrates Parents, supra note 27 (“[P]roviders may be ‘hiding behind HIPAA,’
so that they don’t have to deal with families . . . .”).
73. “Institutions tend to be sticky—once in place and accepted, they can limit policy change and
future choices.” Overcoming Behavioral and Institutional Inertia, in World Dev. Rep. 321 (2010),
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barriers to the implementation of a policy of standard dissemination of
PHI on an involuntary psychiatric hold to family caretakers. Despite
OCR’s clarifications, a solution that incorporates a required disclosure is
still needed to promote compliance by the nation’s health care providers.

III. Competency, Decisional Capacity, and the Decision to
Release Information
When evaluating the decision to release medical information, it is
important to first understand the legal framework of how individual
patients generally make health care decisions. This Part examines the
legal principles that guide who has decisionmaking authority for patients’
health care, and how they exercise that authority.
According to long-established common law principles, an
74
individual’s competency to make medical decisions is presumed. State
statutory law has widely incorporated and codified this common law
principle, presuming that people are competent to make medical
75
decisions, including the decision to release medical information.
The legal concept of decisional capacity, or the ability to make
decisions with regard to medical care, has been the subject of
76
considerable and long-standing debate. The current understanding of
decisional capacity examines whether an individual has: “(1) possession
of a set of values and goals, (2) the ability to communicate and
understand information, and (3) the ability to reason and deliberate
77
about one’s choices.” Physicians will often make assessments by asking
the patient to make a choice regarding treatment, encouraging the
patient to repeat information about the medical condition and treatment,
describe their views of the treatment and likely outcomes, and compare

available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1327504426766/83896261327510418796/Chapter-8.pdf.
74. Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1967) (“It is well settled that the law will
presume sanity rather than insanity, competency rather than incompetency . . . .”).
75. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 11 (1993) (consolidating various state laws related to
health care decisionmaking).
76. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1579 (“Courts have been much more likely to finesse the
issue out of the law and back into medicine . . . Ironically, medical textbooks point out that the
standard for capacity is a legal, not a medical one.”); see also Robert Miller, The Continuum of
Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons,
74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1169, 1198 (“Mental health and legal professionals have often differed in their
interpretations of the capacity issue.”).
77. President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical &
Behavioral Research, 1 Making Health Care Decisions: A Report on the Ethical and Legal
Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship 5760 (1982). Dr. Paul
Appelbaum alternatively describes the legal standard as generally embodying four criteria: “[A]bilit[y] to
communicate a choice, to understand the relevant information, to appreciate the medical consequences
of the situation, and to reason about treatment choices.” Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 1834, 1835 (2007).
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treatment options and consequences to offer reasons for their selection.
In an early and influential article, the authors, Loren Roth, Alan Meisel,
and Charles Lidz analyzed various tests for competency and concluded
that testing competency to consent to treatment (a previous incarnation
79
to decisional capacity) operated as a sort of “sliding scale” in practice.
Under this sliding scale, if the benefit of treatment was likely to far
outweigh the risks, there was a low standard of competency when the
patient consented, and a high standard for competency when the patient
80
refused—and vice versa. In more recent scholarship, Dr. Paul
Appelbaum highlights that the “stringency of the test applied varies
directly with the seriousness of the likely consequences of patients’
81
decisions,” a continuation of the sliding scale approach in practice.
Arguably, the principle of benevolence and the doctrine of best interests
underlie the sliding-scale nature of the application of the competency
82
test. In other words, when a patient made decisions that were
objectively “rational” and comported with what the physician thought
was the best decision given the medical circumstances, there was more of
a presumption of competency, and thus, a greater incidence of finding
83
competency. When decisions were objectively seen as wholly “irrational”
given the medical circumstances, the test for competency slid to a higher
84
standard. To a certain extent, the physician was then more likely to find
the individual “incompetent” to make the decision because her decision
was not objectively in her best interests.
For individuals involuntarily hospitalized because of an active
psychosis or other condition that necessitated their psychiatric hold, all
three decisional capacity factors weigh against recognizing that they
possess decisional capacity to withhold release of information to a
caregiver. When the individual is in the grips of acute psychosis and, for
example, under a delusion that she is the Queen of England, making
decisions for the good of her subjects, the values and goals she possesses

78. Appelbaum, supra note 77, at 1836 tbl. 1.
79. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am. J. Psychiatry
279, 280 (1977); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Mental Illness and Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 105, 108 (1995) (“[D]epending on the facts of a case and
precedent in that jurisdiction, court decisions might be based on one standard or some combination of
standards.”).
80. See Roth et al., supra note 79.
81. Appelbaum, supra note 77, at 1836.
82. See infra Part III.A.
83. Roth et al., supra note 80, at 281.
84. See James F. Drane, Competency to Give an Informed Consent: A Model for Making Clinical
Assessments, 252 JAMA 925, 925 (1984) (“Rather than selecting a single standard of competency, a sliding
scale is suggested that requires an increasingly more stringent standard as the consequences of the patient’s
decision embody more risk.”).
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cannot reasonably be described as her own. Someone suffering from an
acute episode of schizophrenia, and speaking in disorganized jumbles of
sentences about persecution from everyone working with the government
(and with no credible evidence to support such conclusions), cannot
reasonably be said to “understand information” or “be able to reason and
86
deliberate.” An individual suffering through a psychotic manic episode,
rapidly cycling through thoughts that are disjointed and grandiose, cannot
plausibly be described as able to “reason and deliberate” about her
87
choices.
Indeed, the acute and drastic flare-up that brings an individual into
an involuntary hold often happens because the individual’s underlying
illness has progressed to a point where her capacity faculties are greatly
diminished. When someone meets the criteria for an involuntary hold,
there is strong evidence that she does not have the capacity at that point
88
to make decisions regarding treatment or regarding the release of PHI
to a family caretaker as part of that treatment. The state statutes that
authorize involuntary holds have at their core the principle that at that
time the individual lacks the capacity to make the decision to be taken in
for evaluation. Therefore, another legally designated actor makes the
determination for the individual, regardless of whether the individual
wants the decision to be made; the hold is involuntary. Psychosis can last
for varying periods, and might abate shortly after an individual is placed
on an involuntary hold. However, even after an initial acute psychosis
dissipates, many individuals with certain common psychiatric illnesses
will continue to suffer from a lack of insight into their illness, a condition
89
known as “anosognosia,” which will continue to impair two decisional
85. Janet L. Davies & Ellen H. Janosik, Mental Health and Psychiatric Nursing: A Caring
Approach 760 (1991).
86. Such psychotic breaks can also be the result of substance abuse. Many times the presentation
of symptoms overlaps so that accurate diagnosis takes some time. See Carol L.M. Caton et al.,
Differences Between Early-Phase Primary Psychotic Disorders With Concurrent Substance Use and
Substance-Induced Psychoses, JAMA Psychiatry (Feb. 1, 2005), http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleid=208288. Although the two causes may be distinct, the practical effect of their
symptoms should apply equally for the decisional capacity analysis.
87. See David DiSalvo, What Really is a Psychotic Break with Reality?, Forbes (Aug. 10, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2012/08/10/what-really-is-a-psychotic-break-with-reality/
(“‘[P]sychotic break with reality’ means losing contact with reality, such as hearing, seeing, tasting,
smelling, or feeling something that has no external correlate (i.e., hallucinations) or believing
something to be true that is false, fixed, and fantastic (i.e., a delusion) or being unable to sequence
one’s thoughts or control a flight of ideas that becomes increasingly tangential (i.e., thought
disordered), or emotions wildly inconsistent with external reality (such as catatonia, the wild flights of
someone in a manic episode, or a complete absence of affect).”).
88. In California, an involuntary psychiatric hold by itself does not rebut the presumption of
competency to make treatment decisions. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5326.5(d), 5331 (West
2015); Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 208 (Ct. App. 1987).
89. Anosognosia is commonly defined as “lack of insight” or not seeing what ails you.
Anosognosia (Lack of Insight) Fact Sheet, NAMI, http://www2.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Mental_Illnesses/Schizophrenia9/Anosognosia_Fact_Sheet.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Anosognosia
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capacity factors: the ability to communicate and understand information,
and the ability to reason and deliberate about one’s choices.
The discussion of decisional capacity centers around the question of
whether the individual patient has the capacity to make a health care
treatment decision. As this Note argues, the release of an individual’s
medical information during an involuntary psychiatric hold should be
liberalized to include informal family caregivers, under the rationale that
such a release is part of the individual’s treatment. Thus, withholding or
disseminating information can be seen as a treatment decision, which
should not be left in the hands of an individual who is incapacitated at
that time. The next Part discusses how vesting this decision completely in
the hands of the incapacitated individual undermines the doctrine of best
interests and does not comport with the actual spirit of the principle of
autonomy.
A. The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Health Care Decisionmaking
The idea underlying the Privacy Rule and compassionate care for an
90
incapacitated individual is the doctrine of best interests. Under the
doctrine of best interests, a surrogate decisionmaker is required to make
91
decisions that best promote the incapacitated individual’s welfare.
Interestingly enough, the doctrine of best interests initially increased the
autonomy of incapacitated individuals during a time when incompetent
92
or incapacitated persons were viewed as property of their guardians.
Thus, the foundation of the doctrine of best interests contains an element
of increased autonomy.
Today, the doctrine of best interests and its underlying principle of
beneficence often stand counterpoised to the doctrine of “substituted
93
judgment,” which seeks to uphold the principle of autonomy. The
also commonly occurs in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. Id. Anosognosia is distinct
from psychological denial, and is regarded as “a core feature of the neurobiology of these conditions.”
Id.; see also Laura Flashman et al., Specific Frontal Lobe Subregions Correlated with Unawareness of
Illness in Schizophrenia, 13 J. Neuropsychiatry Clinical Neuroscience 255, 256 (2001); Insight and
Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders (Xavier F. Amador &
Anthony S. David eds., 2d ed. 2004). In addition, the condition is the “single largest reason why people
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do not take their medications.” Anosognosia (Impaired
Awareness of Illness): A Major Problem for Individuals with Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder,
Treatment Advoc. Center (June 2005), http://www.nami.org/Content/Microsites86/NAMI_Albuquerque/
Home82/Current_Activities/NAMIWalks6/Briefing-anosognosia_(05).pdf.
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for the Future,
2012 Utah L. Rev. 1541, 1557 (2012).
92. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of
All Ages, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 187, 187 (2007). Kopelman points out use of the best interests doctrine
“does not require ignoring all other duties . . . or others’ interests in deciding what ought to be done
for someone.” Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
93. For further discussion on the principle of autonomy, see Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute
Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 355, 38889 (positing that mental illness
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“substituted judgment” doctrine often relies on evidence of the patient’s
preferences, as laid out through directives or other oral or written
statements of preference, in order to guide a surrogate decisionmaker in
advancing an individual’s treatment wishes if and when the individual
94
becomes incapacitated at a later time. If such evidence is not available,
substituted judgment also asks the surrogate decisionmaker to “review
the values of a formerly competent patient to determine” what to decide
95
under the circumstances. This section will examine how the doctrines
underlie the creation of statutory schemes regarding medical treatment
decisions and guide current decisionmaking.
B. Statutory Surrogates Act as Decisionmakers for Incapacitated
Persons
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
created a statutory scheme that seeks to incorporate these doctrines in a
uniform and comprehensive act. The Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act (“UHCDA”) lists a hierarchy of surrogates who can serve as
96
decisionmakers once the primary physician has determined that the
individual lacks capacity (and there is no commonly used instrument like
97
an advance directive to convey the patient’s instructions). These
surrogates are the individuals who will use either “substituted judgment”
or “best interests” to make the decision for the incapacitated patient.
98
The exact list and its contours can vary from state to state. The
UHCDA lists, in descending order of primacy: spouse, adult child,
parents, sibling, close friend, and a residual exception for another adult
who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient and is familiar

limits autonomy to a greater degree, or in a more important way, than does involuntary treatment, and
that true autonomy must include “freedom from internal constraint”). Another response to the
argument of applying a traditional principle of autonomy even in cases of serious mental illness comes
from the Supreme Court: “One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
94. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1582.
95. Id.
96. The Act defines a “primary physician” as “a physician designated by an individual or the
individual’s agent, guardian, or surrogate, to have primary responsibility for the individual’s health
care or, in the absence of a designation or if the designated physician is not reasonably available, a
physician who undertakes the responsibility.” Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra
note 75, § 1.
97. Id. The act has been adopted in whole by six states (Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New
Mexico, and Wyoming) and forms the basis of several states’ laws with regard to advance directives.
Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1583.
98. New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act lists a “close friend” on the surrogacy list.
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2994-d(1)(f). The UHCDA does not list a “close friend” on the surrogacy
list, but it does have a residual exemption for “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for
the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available.”
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 5(c).
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with the patient’s values. While some states have not adopted such a
surrogate list, that decision is not necessarily based on uncertainty about
100
the need for, or legitimacy of, a surrogate decisionmaker list. Instead,
such a decision has notably been linked to pressure from groups
concerned about issues such as same-sex couple recognition and whether
the welfare of fetuses should be considered for incapacitated pregnant
101
women.
Statutory surrogate lists dovetail with the long-standing standard
medical practice of seeking consent regarding an incapacitated person’s
treatment decisions from his or her close family members. Illustrating
this view, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research suggested multiple
reasons for traditional deference to family members, including that the
family (1) is generally most concerned about the good of the patient;
(2) deserves recognition as an important social unit that should be
treated as a responsible decisionmaker in matters that intimately affect
its members; and (3) will usually be most knowledgeable about the
102
patient’s goals, preferences, and values. Of course, these assumptions
may not always accurately reflect particular relationships between family
103
members related by blood or marriage, but the Commission adopted a
104
broader definition of family, as used within this Note. Indeed, the
purpose of the UHCDA as a whole, and the statutes it inspired, is to
ensure that decisionmaking power stays with the patient when she has
105
capacity, and that authority stays “within the family” otherwise.
Here, the decision to release information to the family caregiver
should remain with the family caregiver. With the authority to make
health care decisions that is afforded to a statutory surrogate, family
caregivers can make the decision to release information about an
individual during an involuntary psychiatric hold to themselves. The
states that have already adopted this portion of the UHCDA allow the
family caretaker to have access to information about the patient, but only

99. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 5(b).
100. See, e.g., Jacob Appel, Finally Give N.Y. Families End-of-Life Decisionmaking Power, N.Y.
Daily News (Sept. 26, 2009, 1:29 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/finally-give-n-y-familiesend-of-life-decisionmaking-power-article-1.402420.
101. Id.
102. President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical &
Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical,
Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 127 (1983); Furrow et al., supra note 22, at
1597 (noting family consent is “good medical practice (and good common sense) being subtlety
absorbed by the law”).
103. See infra Part IV.D.2.
104. See supra note 4.
105. See Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, supra note 75, § 6 cmt. at 26 (“Decisions should
whenever possible be made by a patient, or the patient’s guardian, agent, or surrogate in consultation
with the patient’s health-care providers without outside interference.”).
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in limited circumstances; that is, where there is no advance directive, and
then, depending on the doctrine used, when release of information is
either in the best interests of the patient, or consistent with what the
patient would have wanted if she was competent.
C. Psychiatric Advance Directives as Evidence of Incapacitated
Persons’ Preferences
Advance directives are other tools used to deal with the problem of
serving the underlying goal of autonomy within the doctrine of
substituted judgment when an individual lacks decisional capacity. They
are statutorily created legal tools that enhance the autonomy of the
106
patient when appropriate. Advance directives refer to two different
types of legal tools: individual instructions (for example, the living will)
and durable powers of attorney (that is, the proxy or health care
representative). Each can be completed separately, but people are often
encouraged to complete both for comprehensive guidance. The UHCDA
combines these tools. Whereas living wills are principally addressed at
107
end of life decisionmaking, the durable power of attorney essentially
designates an agent or proxy to speak for the individual and make
108
selected health care decisions. Early on at common law, the power of
109
attorney expired upon the “incapacity” of the principal. Subsequently,
the Uniform Probate Code was amended to allow such a power to
remain in effect and even become effective upon an individual’s
110
incapacitation. Today, the vast majority of states have statutes that
formally authorize the execution of durable powers of attorney for health
111
care decisions.
An individual, while presumably having the requisite decisional
capacity, creates an advance directive guiding a health care decision to be
made at a later time, if and when that individual lacks decisional
capacity. The individual instructions then guide the proxy in making a
decision consistent with the individual’s previously expressed choice.
Thus, the proxy has power to make designated decisions for the
individual. When an individual does not designate a proxy, statutory
112
surrogate lists like the UHCDA designate the decisionmaker.
106. See Leslie P. Francis, Skeletons in the Family Medical Closet: Access of Personal Representatives to
Interoperable Medical Records, 4 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 371, 392–93 (2011).
107. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1592 (discussing rise of living will statutes or “right to die”
legislation after the Karen Quinlan case). In some states, they only address people who are terminally
ill, or those in a persistent vegetative state. Id.
108. Id. at 1593.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 4124(b) (West 1994) (“This power of attorney shall become
effective upon the incapacity of the principal.”).
112. See supra Part III.B.
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Proponents of the use of advance directives herald them for their
113
autonomy-enhancing qualities. From an autonomy-centric point of
view, advance directives do allow an individual to specify in advance
114
whether certain representatives will have access to her medical records.
However, that argument does not consider individuals with severe mental
illness who lack insight into their illnesses and may be placed on
115
involuntary psychiatric holds often. Without awareness of their illness,
a patient in this situation is almost certain not to enact any instruction or
create any durable power of attorney in another to receive information.
In fact, in many of the severe cases, the individual may not even have the
requisite decisional capacity to execute a valid individual instruction or a
durable power of attorney. Furthermore, if she did, it stands to reason
that she might do so merely to try to avoid treatment or dissemination of
information regarding an illness that she might insist that she does not
have.
Such severe cases arguably fall under a “need to know” approach to
releasing PHI, because the information is relevant to current decisions
116
about protecting and treating the patient now and in the future. A
limitation on the information released to personal representatives on a
“need to know” basis lacks substantive distinction when that personal
representative is a family caregiver. The individual’s current symptoms,
diagnosis, treatment plan options, and prognosis are all critical to the
family caregiver so as to integrate her into the treatment plan and allow
her to plan future accommodations. Finding out where a loved one is
117
being kept on a 5150 is “need to know.” Even when the individual
being held is not chronically in the hospital, a so-called “frequent
118
flyer,” the rationale still applies. Important medication changes, followup doctor visits, additional medication changes, and what is happening to
the patient in an involuntary psychiatric hold are all “need to know”
details for the family caregiver for purposes of releasing PHI.
Some have argued that the doctrine of substituted judgment, which
underpins the use of advance directives, is too speculative to be applied
reliably, and that there is simply no way to protect the autonomy of a

113. See generally Francis, supra note 106 (examining advance directives as implemented by states and
making recommendations).
114. Id. at 393.
115. Estimated at forty percent and fifty percent for cases of bipolar and schizophrenia, respectively. See
Anosognosia, supra note 89.
116. Francis, supra note 106, at 395.
117. See supra note 3.
118. See Linda Paradiso, Frequent Flyers: Treat Returning Psychiatric Patients Like Valued Customers,
Nurse.com (May 27, 2013), https://news.nurse.com/2013/05/27/frequent-flyerstreat-returning-psychiatricpatients-like-valued-customers/ (defining and criticizing the term used by hospital staff “to describe the
patients who are admitted often to our psychiatric units”).
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patient without decisional capacity. In the case where there is no
possible method for establishing what the autonomous patient would do
if she had capacity, bioethicists and courts move to the second principle
of health care decisionmaking—beneficence—and rely on the doctrine of
120
best interests to guide the decisionmaker. This approach supports the
adoption of the doctrine of best interests in this context, and allows the
decisionmaker to have access to the PHI of the incapacitated individual.
Unfortunately, commentators have argued that advance care
directives are more likely to be upheld when patients are refusing
treatment and asserting autonomy rather than requesting treatment and
121
beneficence, at least in the context of involuntary psychiatric holds.
Thus, the analogous problem exists where advance directives that refuse
to allow dissemination of information to anyone in the case of an
involuntary psychiatric hold may be upheld whereas advance directives
that direct a release of information may not. This problem suggests that
advance directives for the direct release of information may be on a
shakier practical ground, and thus, not an ideal avenue for attacking the
problem. Nevertheless, the increased publicity and attention of advance
122
directives suggests that these tools may form part of the solution
because individuals could create advance directives to release PHI to
family caregivers ahead of time.

IV. Solutions to Promote Disclosure
A. College Admissions Processes Could Encourage Advanced
Consent to Release Information to Designated Family Members
Because advance directives are generally regarded as autonomy
enhancing, they form a good starting point to discuss solutions. The

119. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1583; see also Rebecca S. Dresser, Advance Directives, SelfDetermination, and Personal Identity, in Advance Directives in Medicine 155, 157 (1989) (stating
“future-oriented treatment decisions cannot be equated with the active choices of competent
patients”); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment,
100 Yale L.J. 1, 67 n.269 (1990).
120. See, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should From Doctors: Rethinking PatientAutonomy and the Doctor Patient Relationship, 13 Health Matrix 235, 28486 (referring to doctrine
of best interests as “[a] better way to decide what should be done for incompetent patient . . . [that]
requires focus on reality, rather than fiction, and . . . considers many relevant interests, not just one”).
121. Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s Say?, 89 Ky. L.J. 327,
35658 (2000) (noting constitutional right to refuse treatment, but not to obtain treatment); see also
Margo Flug, No Commitment: Kendra’s Law Makes No Promise of Adequate Mental Health Treatment,
10 Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol’y 105, 121 (2003) (“Proxies are generally viewed as a means for patients
to refuse unwanted treatment rather than to demand desired treatment.”).
122. President Barack Obama purportedly became the first U.S. president to acknowledge he has an
advance directive. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in an AARP Tele-Town Hall on
Health Care Reform (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-in-AARP-Tele-Town-Hall-on-Health-Care-Reform/.
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Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) currently allows
post-secondary educational institutions to “disclose information from
education records to any person whose knowledge of the information is
necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other
124
individuals.” This FERPA exception is limited to the period of the
125
emergency and the information needed to address the emergency.
Post-secondary educational institutions often condition enrollment
126
on meeting certain medical requirements. Accordingly, post-secondary
educational institutions could strongly encourage students during
enrollment to sign a waiver to explicitly authorize the release of necessary
health information to their parents (or other appropriate designated
caregiver) in the event of a medical emergency that involves serious
medical or mental health conditions in which treating professionals or
school authorities reasonably believe that involvement of the identified
family member would be in the student’s best interest. The release could
limit the amount of information to only as much as necessary to serve that
student’s best interest. Such an initiative is strongly supported by the
reality that many mental illnesses manifest during late teenage years,
precisely the time that many students in the United States enter and
127
attend college.
128
While
An optional advance directive will have drawbacks.
proponents of an optional waiver may argue that merely bringing up the
topic is a sufficient enough impetus to have students and parents agree to
sign such a waiver, experience counsels that young adults often think
129
they are “invincible.” The motivation to deny the possibility of illness is
123. For general information on FERPA, see Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),
U.S. Dept. Educ., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html.
124. 34 C.F.R. § 99.36 (2010).
125. Faculty Handbook Provides Guidance in Assisting Students in Distress; FERPA Privacy
Exceptions Permit Faculty Intervention/Referral, 32 Dev. Mental Health L. 4, 7 (2013).
126. State Information: Meningococcal Prevention Mandates for Colleges and Universities,
Immunize.org, http://www.immunize.org/laws/menin.asp (showing most states require vaccination as a
condition of enrollment). Even before the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, “about 30 percent of
colleges nationwide required students to have health insurance . . . and some states also [had] health
insurance requirements for college students.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-389,
Health Insurance: Most College Students Are Covered Through Employer-Sponsored Plans, and Some
Colleges and States Are Taking Steps to Increase Coverage (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08389.pdf.
127. See Mental Illness Exacts Heavy Toll, supra note 44 (“Half of all lifetime cases begin by age
14; three quarters have begun by age 24. Thus, mental disorders are really the chronic diseases of the
young.”).
128. An alternative proposal would consist of a mandatory advance directive. While such a
requirement resolves the drawbacks of an optional form, it also raises constitutional questions. The
Author suggests a nonmandatory option for its decreased risk of litigation and its comparative ease of
implementation now, and the exploration of a mandatory requirement in the near future.
129. Alexandra Petri, President Obama Is Funny, Mean, Promoting Healthcare.gov on “Between Two
Ferns”, Wash. Post (March 11, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/
2014/03/11/president-obama-is-funny-mean-promoting-healthcare-gov-on-between-two-ferns/ (providing
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even stronger when dealing with stigmatized illnesses such as major
130
depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and so forth. It is a rare
student (or parent) who contemplates (or even wants to contemplate)
the possibility of such illness. And talking to someone during her difficult
transition from adolescence to young adulthood is already difficult for
131
families. However, the implementation of this advance directive would
further enhance the existing autonomy rationale underlying the use of
advance directives in health care planning. Creating an advance directive
triggers contemplation and planning. This planning process also gives the
young person choice in assigning who receives her PHI in the event of an
involuntary psychiatric hold or similar medical emergency, thus directly
addressing any fears about a possible loss of autonomy associated with
an automatic release of PHI. Thus, it empowers her to choose the
individuals who she feels are most likely to be effective caregivers should
the situation present itself. The college advance directive also allows the
young person to exclude relatives whom she does not want to have access
to her information, for reasons including strained relations or a judgment
that certain individuals would not be effective caregivers or productive in
the treatment process.
Although some critics may argue that encouraging students to
create an advance directive violates HIPAA’s underlying policy, this
requirement actually addresses critics’ concerns regarding individual
autonomy. If HIPAA’s underlying justification is to protect an
individual’s choice, broadly defined, then such a rule would seem to
invite litigation. However, if HIPAA’s underlying justification is
correctly seen as empowering individuals in making their health care
choices, then the impetus of such a requirement actually effectuates the
exercise of choice. The individual is empowered to designate caregivers
to receive information at an earlier time when she has more capacity, as
opposed to waiting until her decisional capacity is called into question by
an acute psychotic episode and manifestations of mental illness, then
leaving the designation and decision up to a statutory surrogacy list. This

link to video clip); see also Kathrine Vargas, Why Do Young People Need Obamacare?, WhiteHouse.gov
(Sept. 28, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/09/28/why-do-young-people-needobamacare.
130. “Stigma among emerging adults persists the notion that it is shameful to suffer from a
behavioral health issue and that coming forward to seek diagnosis and treatment will limit academic
and vocational achievement. Social stigma leads to needless embarrassment, especially when associated
with peer groups. It is not surprising, to find that only 1 in 3 students that need mental health care will
actually seek assistance.” Ashley Clement, Breaking Down Barriers to Mental Health Services in
Emerging Adulthood, 13 Harv. Health Pol’y Rev. 32, 32 (2012).
131. Developmental psychologists, mental health professionals, and other scholars now refer to the
developmental stage between adolescence and early adulthood as “emergent adulthood.” Jeffrey J.
Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties,
55 Am. Psychologist, 469, 470 (2000).
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proposal’s strongest upside is its incorporation of the traditional
understanding of autonomy.
The real downside to relying on this advance directive solution is
that it only reaches a fraction of the undefined demographic that will at
some point go into an involuntary psychiatric hold. Not everyone in the
132
Furthermore, the
United States attends post-secondary schools.
initiative would not reach anyone who has already moved passed the
enrollment process at a college or university. And as it is optional, many
students may not choose to create an advance directive. Thus, this
proposal is not ideal, because leaving out those broad swaths of society
fails to provide a comprehensive solution. Nevertheless, it is still an
option available to reach a large number of college-bound youths.
B. Expansive Interpretation of “Treatment” Could Include
Communications with Family Caregivers
As discussed above, there is ample evidence to support the finding
that family members are an important part of the treatment process in
133
If the family
treating an individual with severe mental illness.
134
caregivers’ role is recognized as that of a treatment provider, then the
135
release of information is permitted under current HIPAA language.
However, the release of information under the “treatment” provision of
136
HIPAA is still permissive. That means providers still run into the same
pitfalls that prevent disclosure of information today: financial burden,
137
staff burden, and institutional inertia. While the DHHS can issue more
guidance and education to providers in an effort to try to counteract
those barriers, previous guidance letters to treatment providers have
proven to be unsuccessful in changing provider policy. The “treatment
provider” solution still suffers from the lack of a requirement on the
providers to comply and release information. If this solution is to be

132. In October 2013, 65.9% of 2013 high school graduates were enrolled in colleges or universities.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2013 High School Graduates
(Apr. 16, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm.
133. See supra note 33.
134. See, e.g., Janki Shankar & Senthil Sonai Muthuswamy, Support Needs of Family Caregivers of
People Who Experience Mental Illness and the Role of Mental Health Services, Families in Society, J.
Contemp. Soc. Services 302 (2007) (“Family caregivers are an irreplaceable resource for the mental health
services system and the pillars on which the system currently rests.”); Family Caregiving, Am. Psychol.
Ass’n, http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/cyf/caregiving-facts.aspx (describing general family caregiving
duties as including medical care adherence monitoring).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014).
136. Some question might remain as to whether some of the PHI of an individual on an involuntary
psychiatric hold falls under the “psychotherapy notes” characterization, which requires authorization
of the individual. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (2014). For the most part, however, these categories of
PHI are well-defined. See HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information, supra note 8 (listing various
categories of information that would not fall under “psychotherapy notes”).
137. See supra Part I.B.
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further developed, the focus should remain on devising a requirement
that will ensure provider compliance.
C. An Amendment to the HIPAA Privacy Rule Can Clarify That
Physicians Can Release Protected Health Information to a
Family Caregiver
A more straightforward and inclusive approach to the problem is to
designate a family caretaker as a personal representative within the
provisions of the Privacy Rule. There is proposed legislation that would
designate a family caretaker as a “personal representative” for the Privacy
138
Rule’s purposes, among other purposes. Congressman Tim Murphy of
Pennsylvania introduced legislation in the 20132014 congressional term
to clarify the Privacy Rule and “the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act so physicians and mental health professionals can provide
crucial information to parents and caregivers about a loved one who is in
an acute mental health crisis to protect their health, safety, and well139
being.” Congressman Murphy reintroduced this bill in the 114th session
140
of Congress. Under this proposal, a “caregiver” of an individual with a
serious mental illness is defined as an immediate family member, who
assumes primary responsibility for providing a basic need of such
individual, or a personal representative determined by the laws of the
141
state. The bill also defines “an individual with serious mental illness” as
someone (1) eighteen years or older (2) who has been diagnosed (within
one year of the date of information disclosure) with “a mental,
behavioral, or emotional disorder” that meets the diagnostic criteria of
the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and (3)
“results in functional impairment of the individual that substantially
interferes with or limits one or more major life activities of the
142
individual.” The proposed amendment to HIPAA would directly allow
a family caretaker to receive PHI about an individual who is held on an
involuntary psychiatric hold without requiring the individual’s explicit
consent. The proposal only affects adults eighteen years and older
because before then, adult caretakers such as parents or guardians of an

138. The Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act, H.R. 3717, 113th Cong. § 301(a) (2013),
available at http://murphy.house.gov/uploads/HR3717%20Bill%20Text.pdf.
139. See supra note 38; see also H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 301(a).
140. Reps. Murphy and Johnson Reintroduce the Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act,
Congressman Tim Murphy (June 4, 2015), http://murphy.house.gov/latest-news/reps-murphy-andjohnson-reintroduce-the-helping-families-in-mental-health-crisis-act/.
141. Id. Murphy’s bill indicates basic needs include “food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety,” as
well as “assum[ing] the responsibility of co-signing a loan with the individual.” H.R. 3717 113th Cong.
§§ 705(3)(D), 302(k)(2)(A).
142. H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 302(k)(2)(C).
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individual generally have access to their health information. Murphy’s
proposal also includes caregiver access to certain education records
under FERPA when the treating mental health professional “reasonably
believes such disclosure to the caregiver is necessary to protect the
144
health, safety, or welfare” of that individual or others. This additional
piece of informational access allows the caregiver to have access to medical
treatment-related documents that high schools and post-secondary
educational institutions will hold regarding incidents, treatments, and
evaluations that occur at school.
This approach has a number of advantages. It easily works its way
into the language of the existing Privacy Rule. Providers can easily
understand that once the Privacy Rule recognizes someone as a
“personal representative,” that representative is entitled to receive the
145
individual’s PHI, subject to the endangerment exception. The proposed
bill also requires the provider to consider the family caregiver a “personal
representative” when the provider “reasonably believes it is necessary . . .
to protect the health, safety, or welfare of such individual or the safety of
146
one or more individuals.” Also, the inclusion of access to records under
FERPA gives the caretaker more information regarding the nature of the
individual’s illness, further facilitating the caregiver’s ability to assist with
treatment.
One possible criticism of the proposal rests on the notion that
allowing all “immediate family members” the designation of “personal
representative” for HIPAA purposes could lead to dissemination of
information to family members who have no role in the treatment of the
individual or her life generally. That would not address the real problem
this Note seeks to remedy, that of providing important information to
actual caretakers, and may actually complicate matters further for the
individual. One response to this criticism is to remove the “immediate
family member” clause because the subsequent clause already includes
the established family caregiver“an individual who assumes primary
147
responsibility for providing a basic need of such individual.” Thus,
“immediate family member” becomes duplicative when the immediate
family member actually assumes primary responsibility for caring for the
individual. A second response is that the additional disclosure would not

143. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i) (2014). This depends on the particular governing state law. See
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82582 (Dec. 28,
2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164) (“Where states have . . . explicitly acted, for example, to
authorize disclosure, defer the decision to disclose to the discretion of the health care provider, or
prohibit disclosure of minor’s protected health information to a parent, the rule defers to these
decisions to the extent that they regulate such disclosures.”).
144. H.R. 3717 113th Cong. § 301(a).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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be harmful given HIPAA’s existing “endangerment exception” protection
148
against releasing information that would endanger the individual.
D. Important Considerations
With any of the three previously proposed solutions, other existing
HIPAA provisions would still apply additional considerations to the
release of information. The first provision provides guidance on how much
PHI is released. The second provision serves as an important exception to
inappropriate release of PHI.
1. The Breadth of the Protected Health Information Released Would
Fall Under Exceptions to the Minimum Necessary Rule
Under HIPAA, the amount of PHI released is generally limited to
the “minimum amount of protected health information needed to
149
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”
However, this “minimum necessary” rule does not apply when a health
care provider requests or receives information for treatment purposes,
and an individual’s personal representative requests the information, or
150
when disclosure is required by law. If a release of PHI to a designated
caregiver is indicated by an advance directive, the caregiver can be
considered the individual’s personal representative. If informing family
members is considered treatment under HIPAA, then that release of
information is for treatment. Under Congressman Murphy’s proposal,
the disclosure is made to the individual’s personal representative. Thus,
all three of this Note’s proposed solutions fall within the exceptions to
the “minimum necessary” limit on information disclosure. These
exceptions recognize the need for wide disclosure for treatment purposes,
because the PHI encompasses much important information to take into
consideration when formulating treatment plans involving a family
caregiver.
On the other hand, allowing access to an individual’s entire PHI
may be inappropriate and impractical. First, allowing access to information
unrelated to an individual’s mental illness diagnosis and caretaking needs
appears extraneous to the purpose of these proposed exceptions, and
unnecessarily encroaches on an individual’s privacy with respect to that
extraneous information. Second, providers will need guidance on what
amount of information can be released so as to protect this privacy
interest. One possibility is to include language that the “minimum
necessary” rule applies to these exceptions, which would limit this to the
purpose of the disclosure. A second option is to include new language

148. See infra Part IV.D.2.
149. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 10 (May 2003).
150. Id.
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that limits the information released to that “necessary for the family
member to perform caregiving and supportive roles.”
2. A Safety Rationale for Cabining PHI Disclosure to Family
Members Generally Already Applies
One consideration that must be weighed against both statutory
surrogate lists and expansion of HIPAA to release information to
informal family caregivers is problematic family circumstances. The law
generally assumes that parents, for example, will act in the best interests
151
of a child. Biological family members need not be completely altruistic
in order to want to achieve the “best interests” of their family member
with mental illness. However, there are undoubtedly situations where
past problems, or fundamental differences in values have created such
tension and discord that a biological family member may not care about
the best interests of another, or may actually want to harm them. In other
situations, biological family members may not understand the
information that they receive, or may not believe the diagnosis or illness
152
itself. These scenarios present the distinct possibility that the biological
family member may not want to be part of the treatment team, or would
currently be an ineffective member of the team.
In such cases, the health care provider should be able to withhold
the release of information if, in her professional judgment, the particular
family member’s involvement would have a detrimental effect on the
course of the treatment or on the best interests of the patient. In the
context of a health care decision for an adolescent, the Supreme Court
recognized in Parham v. J.R. that a parent’s authority to make a decision
must be “subject to a physician’s independent examination and medical
153
judgment.” The Privacy Rule already codifies this important standard.
The Privacy Rule itself allows for the health care provider to use her
professional judgment to deny a personal representative access to PHI if
the minor “may be endangered by treating the person as the personal
154
representative, and . . . it is not in the best interests of the patient . . . .”
Thus, the Privacy Rule already affords the health care provider the
ability to avoid automatically releasing information to someone when, in
essence, that someone is not acting as an actual “caregiver” of the
patient. Furthermore, in addition to the health records of the individual,
health care providers also have access to other public records that may
151. See Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting that the “natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children”).
152. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 46, at 76 (“Steve is reluctant to consent to the disclosure of this
information to his parents because of his father’s intolerant attitude toward the use of alcohol and
other drugs.”).
153. 442 U.S. at 604.
154. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5) (2014); see also HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information,
supra note 8, at n.2.
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indicate a negative relationship (for example, a restraining order) and
the health care provider’s own interactions with the person claiming to
be the caregiver and seeking access to the information based on being a
caregiver. The provider can and should rely on a review of this evidence
to arrive at her reasonable belief that a particular request for information
falls under the endangerment exception.

Conclusion
The HIPAA Privacy Rule seeks to afford people the right and
ability to control access to their sensitive health care information.
Generally, that is a good thing. But the Privacy Rule does make a
notable exception for when an individual lacks capacity to make the
decision to release that information. In the case of involuntary psychiatric
holds, individuals often lack decisional capacity because of the acute
episode, whether an initial episode or a chronic episode, that necessitated
their psychiatric hold. Due to the current permissive nature of the
incapacity exception, providers routinely refuse to release information to
the family caregivers involved in the individual’s current and long-term
health. Because of the incentives for health care providers, they
consistently avoid disclosure without express consent from the individual
on the involuntary psychiatric hold. In order to empower families and the
community to better deal with these difficult mental illness challenges, as
well as serve the best interests of the patients themselves, the “default”
of health care providers should be set in the interest of disclosure to
family caregivers as part of treatment. This recognizes the reality of many
severe mental illnesses, and helps health care providersprofessionals
and familyhelp someone in need.
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